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PRACTITIONERS - BEWARE THE TROJAN HORSE:
THE GOVERNMENT UNSHEATHES AN OLD WEAPON TO TARGET
PRACTITIONERS FOR CRIMINAL TAX OFFENSES
by
DANTE MARRAZZO
I. INTRODUCTION
Nestled within the many criminal sanctions of the Internal Revenue Code'
is a little known, less understood, and, until recently, seldom used statute pro-
scribing attempts to interfere with administration of the Internal Revenue laws.
This article will discuss the exponential increase in use of that provision, section
7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, in the last decade to seek prosecution of
tax scofflaws, particularly practitioners, who might have otherwise escaped crim-
inal sanctions. This article will call attention to some perils for the practitioner
relating to representing a client on tax matters. Those perils include possible
criminal prosecution of an attorney for her advice to a client.
II. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
1. Background
Prior to the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States on February 25, 1913,2 the principal sources of revenue for the
Federal government were customs duties and excise or other indirect taxes.' The
first income tax law enacted pursuant to the Sixteenth Amendment was the
Revenue Act of 1913, which imposed a normal tax of 1% on the net incomes of
individuals, estates, trusts and corporations A graduated surtax of 1% to 6% was
imposed on incomes in excess of $20,000.5
* Dante Marrazzo is a retired Special Agent, Criminal Investigation Division, Internal
Revenue Service and is currently practicing law in the Cleveland, Ohio area.
1. I.R.C. §§ 7201 - 7215 (1994).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
3. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 75 YEARS OF IRS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION HISTORY 1919-
1994, U.S DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No. 7233, at 23 (1996).
4. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166, pt 1 (1913).
5. Id.
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The most recent comprehensive enactment of the Internal Revenue Code
("Code") was in 1954.6 Criminal sanctions for violations of the tax laws were
incorporated in that enactment by sections 7201 through 7215 of the Code.7
2. General Criminal Provisions
When the government has sought criminal prosecution for violation of
the Code, it has predominantly used three criminal provisions. Probably the most
familiar criminal tax statute is "tax evasion."8 Additional tax due and owing is an
element of this most frequently charged offense, hence, the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") must establish the corrected tax liability, often a difficult task in
complicated criminal cases. 9Conviction for violation of section 7201 is a felony. 0
As an alternative to proving tax due and owing under section 7201, the
IRS has recommended prosecution for filing a false tax return." This sanction is
mostly used when the tax due cannot be determined with any degree of certain-
ty.'2 Conviction for violation of section 7206(1) is a felony.'
In cases where a tax return has intentionally not been filed, the most
applicable provision is the willful failure to file a tax return. 4 This statute is used
in cases where the IRS cannot prove sufficient overt acts to support a tax evasion
recommendation. 5 Conviction for violation of section 7203 is a misdemeanor.'
6
3. Section 7212(a)
Section 7212(a) provides, in part:
Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force ... endeavors to
intimidate or impede any officer ... acting in an official capacity
under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats
offorce ... obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede,
6. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
7. Id. §§ 7201 - 7215.
8. I.R.C. § 7201 (1994).
9. ROBERT C. WEBB ET AL., CRIMINAL TAX PRACTICE § 4.2 (1995).
10. I.R.C. § 7201 (1994).
11. Id. § 7206(1).
12. WEBB Er AL., supra note 9, § 4.26.
13. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1994).
14. Id. § 7203.
15. WEBB ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.18.
16. LR.C § 7203 (1994).
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the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof....The
term "threats of force," as used in this subsection, means threats of
bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United States or to a
member of his family.' 7
Conviction for violation of section 7212(a) is a felony.'"
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE - SECTION 7212(A)
Section 7212(a) has its earliest roots in the thirty-seventh Congress in
1862. As originally enacted, this section provided:
That if any person shall forcibly obstruct or hinder a collector or
deputy collector in the execution of this act, or of any power and
authority hereby vested in him, or shall forcibly rescue, or cause to
be rescued, any property, articles, or objects, after the same shall
have been seized by him, or shall attempt or endeavor so to do, the
person so offending shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay the
sum of five hundred dollars. 19
As enacted, the statute forbade only the forceful interference with employees in
the performance of their duties or the rescue of seized property and provided a
penalty of $50020
In 1863, the statute was amended to include imprisonment for up to two
years as part of the sanctions for violating the statute.2' In 1864, the statute was
re-enacted to add assessors, revenue agents, and inspectors as persons protected.?
Later that same year, the Internal Revenue Service Act of 1864 was codified to
include the same sanctions against forceful interference with covered employees
or the rescue of seized property."
In the 1939 codification of the Internal Revenue laws, the Act separated
the provisions against forcible interference against an employee and forcible res-
cue of seized property.24 With respect to forcible interference, the Act provided
17. Id. § 7212(a) (emphasis added to identify what has been commonly referred to as the
"omnibus clause").
18. Id.
19. Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 28, 12 Stat. 432, 444 (1862).
20. Id.
21. Revenue Act of 1863, ch. 74, § 28, 12 Stat. 713, 714 (1863).
22. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat. 223, 238 (1864).
23. Internal Revenue Service Act of 1864, ch. 2, § 3177, 18 Stat. 608, 610, pt. 1 (1864).
24. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 34, § 3601(c)(1)-(2), 53 Stat. 435, 436, pt. 1 (1939).
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for fines or imprisonment for any person who might "[florcibly obstruct or hinder
any collector, deputy collector, internal revenue agent, or inspector, in the execu-
tion of any power and authority vested in him by law .... ". 21
The modem version of section 7212(a) was enacted as part of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.26 The section was modified from its lineage to include the
language pertaining to "corruptly or by force.. ." and the obstruction of "the due
administration of this title .... 27
The House of Representatives purported that the current version of sec-
tion 7212(a) was "similar" to 18 U.S.C. § 111, which proscribed assaults of fed-
eral employees engaged in the performance of their duties, but also "amplified"
the protection afforded Internal Revenue Service employees by covering "all
cases where the officer is intimidated or injured; that is, where corruptly, by force
or threat offorce, directly or by communication, an attempt is made to impede the
administration of the internal revenue laws. "28
The Senate version of this section indicated that it would correspond to
that of the House bill except for applicable penalties. 29 The Senate version also
indicated that the section was "broader" than 18 U.S.C. § 111 "in that it covers
threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) or corrupt
solicitation." 30
Differences between the House and Senate versions were resolved by the
Conference Committee in favor of the Senate (and current) version of the statute.3'
Hence, the legislative history of section 7212(a) fails to reveal any
express intent behind the statute other than the protection of government employ-
ees against assaults or threats while in the performance of their duties.
IV. HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
For approximately twenty five years following its enactment in 1954, sec-
tion 7212(a) was used exclusively to prosecute those persons who, by force or
25. Id. § 3601(c)(1).
26. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7212(a), 68A Stat. 851, 855 (1954).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4135-36, 4574-
75 (emphasis added).
29. S. REP. No. 83-1622, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5254.
30. Id.
31. H.R. CONF. REP. 2543, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5280, 5344.
[VOL. 13
4
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 13 [1997], Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol13/iss1/3
CRIMINAL TAX OFFNsEs
threats of force, interfered with IRS employees in the performance of their offi-
cial duties. In a 1982 annotation, the author collected a series of historical cases
prosecuted under section 7212(a).32 The annotation highlights that force or
threats of force against IRS employees was a key ingredient in these cases. 31 The
statutory language pertaining to "force or threats of force" was deemed to be the
operative provision of the statute." The annotation includes only one case (in
1981) prosecuted under circumstances other than acts directed at IRS employees
or their enforcement activities.35
As late as 1974, twenty years after codification of section 7212(a), the
government argued in a tax fraud case that it could not charge the defendant under
section 7212(a) since "that section 'apparently applies only to acts or threats of
"'1 36physical violence ....
V. A CHANGING TREND IN THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
As tax fraud schemes became more complicated, more difficult to detect,
and increasingly difficult to prosecute under the more familiar statutes, the gov-
ernment had to seek innovative approaches to combat tax scofflaws. Rather than
seek new criminal sanctions through legislation, beginning in at least 1981, the
government sought to expand interpretation of section 7212(a) by arguing that
there were two independent provisions of the statute. '
The first provision related to the more familiar use of threats or force
against IRS employees. The second provision was broader and proscribed con-
duct tending to impede the administration of the Code. The operative language
of the second provision, a so-called "omnibus" clause, provides, "Whoever cor-
ruptly ... obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due
administration of this title ... ." 31 An "omnibus bill" is defined as a legislative
bill which includes various separate and distinct matters.39
32. Elaine K. Zipp, Annotation, Corrupt or Forcible Interference With Administration of
Internal Revenue Laws, Under 26 USCS § 7212(a), 60 A.L.R. FED. 776 (1982).
33. Id. at 778-80.
34. Id. at 777. See also United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 761-62 (6th Cir. 1970) (hold-
ing that "[t]he criminal intent involved in this statute is that of intentionally employing a threat
of force in order to obstruct or impede an IRS employee in the lawful discharge of his duties").
35. Zipp, supra note 32, at 780 (citing United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696 (8th Cir.
1981).
36. United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. (1981).
38. I.R.C. § 7212(a) (1994).
39. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1087 (6th ed. 1990).
19971
5
Marrazzo: Criminal Tax Offenses
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1997
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
Whereas section 7212(a) had been used for more than twenty five years
since its enactment to prosecute cases involving force or threats,' starting in 1981,
the government sought to apply the statute in tax fraud cases. ' The government
now looks to section 7212(a) in virtually every tax case.4'
VI. REACTION BY THE COURTS
Perhaps the first case of record came before the court in 1981 where the
government sought to expand the use of section 7212(a) beyond threats or use of
force cases.43 The defendants in the case promoted a tax fraud scheme to others
for profit where they instructed participants to file exempt tax withholding cer-
tificates (IRS Forms W-4) to defeat the payment of income taxes." The court
observed that there were no other cases of record in which the government
attempted to apply the "omnibus" clause in cases not involving actions directed
at IRS employees or their activities.45 The court further noted that it was an issue
of first impression and that it should proceed with caution "where for over 25
years the Government has feared to tread." 46 The court acknowledged that the
legislative history of the statute was "wholly silent of § 7212's omnibus clause." 41
Yet, the court ultimately agreed with the government that the "broad language of
section 7212's omnibus clause demands a correspondingly broad construction."41
Also in 1981, the government asserted violation of section 7212(a) in a
case where a defendant retook his files, which had just been taken by an IRS agent
from the defendant in an investigation of a third party.4 9 The court extensively ana-
lyzed the history of the statute in holding that it proscribed conduct beyond threats
of force .5 Even after the government's successes in expanding application of the
statute in the early 1980's, its use of the statute in cases where force or threats of
force against IRS employees was not involved was infrequent and its expansion
was gradual.
40. Zipp, supra note 32.
41. Stanley F Krysa, Director of Criminal Tax Enforcement, TAX DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, Address at the American BarAssn's 10th National Institute on Criminal Tax Fraud and
Money Laundering (Dec. 2, 1993), in 1993 BNA DAILY TAX REPORT 231, Dec. 3, 1993, at G-
4.
42. Id.
43. United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1981).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 699.
46. Id.
47. Id. at n.13.
48. Williams, 644 F. 2d at 700.
49. United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. La. 1981).
50. Id. at 302-07.
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In 1984, the court addressed the scope of the language of section 7212(a)
where a defendant filed false complaints with the IRS in order to discredit the IRS
auditor and hinder the investigation.5' The court concluded that neither the leg-
islative history nor its language limited its broad terms and analogized the statute
to other broad obstruction of justice statutes.52 The pivotal statutory clause for the
court was the "corrupt endeavor" language, which the court held would include
the filing of a false complaint against an IRS employee.53
VII. THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHES POLICY FOR SECTION 7212(a)
In 1989, the United States Department of Justice (Tax Division) ("DOJ-
Tax") issued a policy statement relating to applicable uses of the "omnibus"
clause of section 7212(a). Under the policy, the government's position was that
the overall purpose of section 7212(a) included a provision to penalize conduct
aimed at general IRS administration of the tax laws. The directive provides, in
part:
In general, the use of the "omnibus" provision of Section 7212(a)
should be reserved for conduct occurring after a tax return has been
filed - typically conduct designed to impede or obstruct an audit or
criminal tax investigatio .... However, this charge might also be
appropriate when directed at parties who engage in large-scale
obstructive conduct involving actual or potential tax returns of third
parties.5M
In relying on its success in court, the government's formal position now
is that section 7212(a) contains two clauses. The first clause is more specific and
relates to the use of force or threats against employees. The second clause is more
general and is referred to as the "omnibus clause," which proscribes any conduct
that either corruptly obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the
due administration of the Code.55
VIII. ELEMENTS OF THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE OF SECTION 7212(a)
There are three elements to the omnibus clause of section 7212(a): (1) in
any way corruptly, (2) endeavoring, and (3) to obstruct or impede the due admin-
51. United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404 (1lth Cir. 1984).
52. d at 1409.
53. Id. at 1409-10.
54. TAX DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIRECTIVE No. 77 (July 7, 1989).
55. TAX DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL § 17.02 (citing United
States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir. 1981).
1997]
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istration of the Internal Revenue Code. 6 Each of these elements will be discussed
in turn.
1. In Any Way Corruptly
The first element of the statute's omnibus clause is "in any way corrupt-
ly." 51 With respect to section 7212(a), the term "corruptly" refers to conduct
intended to secure an unlawful benefit or advantage for oneself or another. 8 It
includes conduct directed at efforts to impede the collection or audit of one's own
or another's tax matters and does not require a showing of bad or evil purpose. 9
In particular, corruptly includes, but is not limited to, an effort to secure a finan-
cial gain.6 The court has concededly afforded broad construction to the "cor-
ruptly" element.,'
2. Endeavoring
The second element of the statute's omnibus clause is "endeavoring." 62
The court has defined "endeavor" under section 7212(a) using language from
cases involving other obstruction of justice statutes 3.6 Under United States v.
Martin, the court adopted the definition of "endeavor" as "any effort.., to do or
accomplish the evil purpose that section was intended to prevent." I
Under a DOJ-Tax operative manual, "[t]he manner by which a defendant
can 'endeavor' to impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws is
unlimited." 61 The agency relies on the "in any other way" broad language in the
opening phrase of the omnibus clause to support its position.6
56. I.R.C. § 7212(a) (1994); Williams, 644 F.2d at 699.
57. I.R.C. § 7212(a) (1994).
58. See e.g., United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1985). See also United
States v. Hanson, 2 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423, 427
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991).
59. Reeves, 752 F.2d at 998.
60. Yagow, 953 F.2d at 427.
61. United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275, 1279 (4th Cir. 1993).
62. I.R.C. § 7212(a) (1994).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 747 F2d 1404, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Osbom
v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) relating to a general obstruction of justice statute).
64. Osborn, 385 U.S. at 333.
65. TAX DIVIsIoN, supra note 55, § 17.05.
66. Id.
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3. To Obstruct or Impede the Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws
The third element of the statute's omnibus clause is an attempt to obstruct
or impede the administration of the Code.67 The most substantive evolution of
application of section 7212(a) is that violation of the statute includes acts not
directed at IRS employees. 68 Proscribed conduct includes other attempts to
impede the administration of the tax laws. 9 The attempt to obstruct or impede the
IRS can be for one's own benefit or for the benefit of another.70 Further, the
attempt need not succeed.7
IX. THE MODERN TREND IN APPLICATION OF SECTION 7212(a)
Perhaps one of the most demonstrative cases of the shift in prosecutorial
use of the statute was before the court in United States v. Popkin.Y In Popkin, an
attorney was convicted of violating section 7212(a) based on his assistance to a
client in creating a domestic corporation to disguise the character of income
earned from selling illegal narcotics.73 The "client" was in fact cooperating with
the government in a sting operation against the attorney.74 At the direction of gov-
ernment agents, the client informed the attorney that he had secreted off shore
approximately $200,000 from illicit drug deals and that he now wanted to repa-
triate the funds and therefore needed to show a legal source of the money on tax
returns.75 The attorney assisted the client in forming a California corporation as a
purported legitimate source of revenue. The attorney also prepared two years of
false tax returns for the client showing a legitimate source of revenue and dis-
cussed methods of repatriating the client's offshore funds.76 The attorney was
charged with two counts relating to the filing of the false tax returns (for which
he was ultimately acquitted) and one count of violation of section 7212(a) (for
which he was ultimately convicted).7
The charge against the attorney for violating section 7212(a) was
premised on his corruptly obstructing and impeding and endeavoring to obstruct
and impede the due administration of the tax laws by creating the domestic cor-
67. I.R.C. § 7212(a) (1994).
68. See supra, Part V.
69. United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275, 1278 (4th Cir. 1993).
70. United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1541 (1lth Cir. 1991).
71. United States v. Rosnow, 977 F.2d 399, 410 (8th Cir. 1992).
72. Popkin, 943 F.2d at 1535.
73. Id. at 1541.
74. Id. at 1536.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Popkin, 943 F. 2d at 1536.
1997]
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poration for the client for purposes of concealment.78 On appeal, the attorney's
principal argument was that the only act charged in the indictment, creating a cor-
poration, was legal, and not proscribed by the obstructing or impeding language
of section 7212(a).79
The government's simple response to the defendant's argument was that
the plain language of the statute makes it clear that force or threats of force are
not required for its violation." The government conceded that the statute was his-
torically used in force or threats of force cases but contended that such historical
use does not alter the plain meaning of the statute.8
In its opinion, the court primarily addressed the term "corruptly," as used
twice in the statute, and whether performing a legal act (i.e. forming a corpora-
tion) could be deemed as "corrupt" within the meaning of the statute.82 The court
noted that the second (omnibus) clause of the statute does not require force or
threats of force and that the clause "expands the reach of the statue by providing
that it is violated if a person 'in any other way,' either corruptly or by force or
threats of force does the prohibited act." 83
In turning to the issue of whether the attorney's act of creating a corpora-
tion was a corrupt act within the meaning of the statute, the court concluded that
"corruptly" is used to forbid acts "done with the intent to secure an unlawful ben-
efit either for oneself or for another." 11 The court went on to conclude that the
attorney's act of creating a corporation for a client was a corrupt act for the pur-
pose of enabling the client to disguise the character of illegally earned income in
order to secure an unlawful benefit for the client. 5
The Fourth Circuit adopted the rationale of Popkin in United States v.
Mitchell where a defendant concededly acted criminally but claimed his conduct
was not violative of section 7212(a). 6 In Mitchell, a United States Department
of Interior zoologist incorporated, and obtained tax-exempt status for, an organi-
zation for purposes of soliciting contributions from big-game hunters to have
endangered animals delisted.87 Mitchell then caused the hunters to falsely claim
78. Id. at 1537.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1538.
81. Id.
82. Popkin, 943 F. 2d at 1539-41.
83. Id. at 1539 (emphasis added).
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1985)).
85. Id. at 1540.
86. United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275, 1278 (4th Cir. 1993).
87. Id. at 1276-77.
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their contributions to the organization as tax-deductible.1
On appeal, Mitchell argued that section 7212(a) requires conduct direct-
ed at another person and that "corruptly" refers to the means of obstructing or
impeding rather than simply a state of mind. 9 In unanimously dismissing
Mitchell's argument, the court cited Popkin's interpretation of section 7212(a)'s
omnibus clause that the "word corruptly was used to 'prohibit all activities that
seek to thwart the efforts of government officers and employees in executing the
laws enacted by Congress."' I The court cited several other cases where courts
presumed a broad construction of the statute.9 '
The modem trend in enforcement of section 7212(a) is to look to the
statute in virtually every potential tax fraud case.9 The six year old DOJ-Tax pol-
icy statement 91 does not accurately reflect the more aggressive posture being
taken by the government in the past few years. The statute will be used more
against doctors, lawyers and accountants. 95 In particular, the offense is deemed
appropriate for practitioners who perform a legal act for an unlawful purpose.96 As
in Popkin and Mitchell, prosecution was based on conduct partially related to the
defendants' roles as tax advisors.
Recent cases where the IRS planned to recommend prosecution for vio-
lation of section 7212(a) include a case against an attorney based on his co-min-
gling of income and trust funds into one bank account; a physician who paid
employees in cash to defeat the payment of income and employment taxes; and a
restaurant owner who attempted to conceal his true income and expenses by deal-
ing mostly in cash, rather than through a business bank account.97
The prosecutorial appeal of section 7212(a) in no small way emanates
88. Id. at 1277.
89. ld.
90. Id. at 1278.
91. Mitchell, 985 F. 2d at 1278-79 (citing United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535 (l1th Cir.
1991); United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Shriver, 967
F.2d 572 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Hatchett, 918 F.2d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hammerman, 528 E2d 326,
328 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Krause, 786 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United
States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984)).
92. Krysa, supra note 41.
93. TAX DIvIsIoN, supra note 54.
94. Krysa, supra note 41.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Interview with John Voorhees, Special Agent, IRS, Criminal Investigation Division (Jan.
4, 1996).
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from its lesser standard of proof. The statute does not require "wilfulness" as an
independent element of the offense.9' Rather, culpability is premised on the con-
cept of corruptness.'
X. AVOIDING THE PITFALLS
The practitioner's best defense against section 7212(a) is to keep detailed
records of tasks they have been engaged to perform for a client."W Practitioners
Robert Webb and Silvija Strikis advise practitioners on the following practices:, ' ,
1. Clearly define, in correspondence with the IRS, an understanding of the
obligation to provide certain information or documents, and clearly state what
information is being provided.
2. Carefully document the advice given to clients concerning sensitive tax
issues, and have an associate present when conducting initial interviews of vul-
nerable clients.
3. Follow applicable state or professional society rules of conduct so as to
avoid the appearance of impropriety.
4. When advising a client, consider how the advice would be viewed if it
appeared on the front page of a newspaper.
5. Be extremely wary when performing work for clients under criminal
investigation.
6. As appropriate, seek the counsel of one experienced in criminal tax mat-
ters if conduct or advice in representing a taxpayer may violate Section 7212(a).
The law or tax practitioner should not be concerned that the IRS stands
ready to wield its freshly honed weapon against the unsuspecting. As expressed
by the courts, the operative word in the statute is "corruptly." Beyond the sound
advice of careful documentation of transactions with clients, there is the old-fash-
ioned "duck" test. If it looks like a duck, acts like a duck, and smells like a duck,
it might be a duck. And some ducks just do not float.
98. United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1985).
99. Robert C. Webb & SilvijaA. Strikis, Service Increases Use of "Impeding IRS" Provision
to Prosecute Tax Professionals, 80 J. TAx'N 362, 364 (June 1994).
100. Id. at 366.
101. Id.
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